Essay 14-Intrinsic and Extrinsic Property

Introduction

Essay 9 and essay 13 has together elaborated how properties combine to form a single object. We are aware that an identity is the collection of properties as it is in separated form. However, the question remains to what extent does an object extend itself. At what point does an object stop being itself and become a totally different object? That will be the purpose of this essay, to explore the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic property.

Intrinsic Property

There is not much to say about the intrinsic property. As it is practically just the regular conception of property as explained in essay 9. However, there are some additional explanations which will only be clear after the explanation of the extrinsic property. The intrinsic property is the property which makes up an object intrinsically. Let us say a car, the car’s intrinsic properties are the properties which directly make up the car.

For example, it would be the engine, the doors, the body, the paint, the chairs, the steering wheel, the airbags, the mass, the dimensions, the colour, the speed, among other properties. All of those properties directly make up the car either physically, philosophically, or both. Another way to understand the intrinsic property is that it is the properties of an object which are outside of the object. This shall be contrasted with the extrinsic property.

Extrinsic Property and Relations

The extrinsic property is a bit more complicated to explain than the intrinsic property. As it is rather non-intuitive, and only makes sense when you think about it deeper. A good starting point is to understand the extrinsic property from a semantic perspective. Extrinsic means outside, so we can say that the extrinsic property is a property which is outside the object, as opposed to being inside the object. This is where it becomes weird.

It is a property, meaning it is part of the object and it constitutes the definition of the object. Yet at the same time it is outside of the object, and does not constitute the intrinsic object, the object which is composed of the intrinsic properties. The reason the extrinsic property lies outside of the object is because it is the relationship between the object and its outside world. The second question then is, what is a relationship?

Relation in philosophy, or at least my system, is different from the standard understanding of dynamic relations. In a dynamic relationship, 2 objects or more are tied in a system of change where they continuously affect each other. A philosophical relationship does not need to be dynamic; it can be static and be without change. In short it is what connects 2 objects or more, what unites 2 objects into 1 larger object, a category.

Let us analyse several relations to examine how relations are objects which tie multiple objects together. An object’s relations to each other can be a measure of similarity, that is how many categories do they share in common. For example, the relationship between a plane and a car is they are both vehicles and belong to that category. Here a category is the clear relations between the car and the plan, it is what is common between each object.

Then we have the dynamic relationship, let us say that X causes Y, based on the principles of change and dynamic property, X is contained in Y and Y contained in X. We may see that there are no common properties but they both contain each other, as such they become tied into a singular system of XY. Despite the lack of similarity, the mutual containment still fulfils the original idea of a relationship, the union of 2 or more objects into a singular categorical object.

Let us then examine concrete forms of relationships in the actual world, such as social relations. Social relationships are rather complicated from a philosophical standpoint, but we may simplify them. A good example is familial relation, let us say X is the father of Y, such that Y is the child of X. Here we see a similar form of mutual containment, albeit stretched to an extent. Other social relations are forms of dynamic relations, and thus still fulfil the idea of relations.

The last example is spatial relationship, or commonly just the distance between objects. Let us assume that X and Y are 100 units apart, we then can say that Y is 100 units from X and X is 100 units from Y. At a glance there is both mutual containment and also similarity, with the similarity here being 100 units. Yet how can we say that there is an actual similarity here? As in the categorical relationship, the similarity exists among intrinsic properties, while the distance of an object from another object seems to be an inherently extrinsic property.

While categorical relationships are supposed to be based on the intrinsic property, it is incredibly difficult to examine or reduce spatial relationships into intrinsic property. Then again, dynamic properties are also a bit of a blur between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. As such, it might be wise to accept that spatial relationships simply exist, without necessarily understanding what it might actually mean. This is especially true when we understand that space is a philosophically unique object and requires an entire philosophical examination of its own.

In spite of any seeming difficulties in defining the idea of extrinsic property, we know that it is a property which involves another object separate from the original object, and that it involves a relationship with another object. The relationship between relationship and extrinsic property is that an extrinsic property always entails a relationship, and all relationships are a result of extrinsic properties.

If the collection of intrinsic properties is the intrinsic object, then the collection of extrinsic properties is the extrinsic object. In combination, they become the total object or the object itself. The idea of extrinsic object means that change can happen very easily, and the definition of object becomes narrower and stricter. As even a slight change in position will already mean that the object is a different object. 2 objects which are intrinsically identical belongs to the same category of intrinsic identity, but as a complete object including the extrinsic object, they are different.

The question is then why is extrinsic properties even necessary at all? How can a relationship with another object constitute the definition of an object? The answer lies primarily within the phenomenon of an object, or our conscious experience of it. In the Indonesian version I mentioned the idea of change, that relationships can change an object and so having an effect on the intrinsic object they must be counted. However, understanding the idea of change, we know that change means the object is replaced altogether. In fact, with the extrinsic property even change of position replaces the object. Finally change can be boiled down to a problem of phenomenon.

When we experience an object, we never experience it on its own, we almost always experience it in a context of other objects. Let us say a car, a car is always seen on the ground or on the road. And the road is surrounded by scenery which includes other buildings, roads, cars, or people, among other things. Let us imagine this, a car 100 units away from us and a car 1 unit away from us may at closer examination look the same, but at the immediate unmodified experience they certainly look different.

Another example is a car on a bridge or a car in a garage, intrinsically they do appear similar, but certainly their surroundings have changed. It is the total experience of the car and the objects which has changed, and is perceivably different. Remember than difference is foremost grounded in perception, if there is a difference of perception than there must be a real difference of property between objects.

An objective form of this phenomenal problem is that objects are commonly part of a system of objects. We cannot isolate this object from its system, and as such if the system changes then the part already exists in another system, and might as well be a different part altogether. It is like a painting, if there is a point in the painting and another point in the painting changes slightly, it is already a different painting. The point may be similar intrinsically, but it is a part of a different painting, a different category, and as such it is a different point.

However, there is another idea, that is if we have 2 intrinsically identical objects but they exist in different positions. We would see the 2 objects at once, but what difference could possibly exist? The only answer is indeed, their position, and so their distance from an arbitrary 0 point in that space. Plurality always implies difference, and as such we must accept that extrinsic properties contribute to the definition of any object.

Conclusion

We obtain several philosophical statements that is, “Intrinsic properties are properties which directly form an object,” “Intrinsic object is the collection of intrinsic properties,” “Extrinsic properties are properties of an object involving another object, or the relationship between an object and another object,” “Relationships are what unites multiple objects into a singular object, a category,” “Extrinsic objects are the collections of extrinsic properties,” and “An object is the combination of the intrinsic and extrinsic properties.” In the next essay we shall discuss the formation of identities. For now this essay is declared to be done.

This essay corresponds to the Indonesian version.